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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Zachary James Devan appeals from his conviction for felony driving under the influence
of alcohol ("DUI"), challenging the district court's denial of his motion to suppress. The district
court erred in denying Mr. Devan's motion to suppress because the officer who stopped his
vehicle based solely on her observation of the passenger-side tires of his truck crossing the fog
line for approximately 100 yards, lasting three to five seconds, lacked reasonable suspicion for
the stop.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
At approximately 9:23 p.m. on a cold, windy night in January, police officer Amanda
Livas saw a truck traveling westbound in medium traffic on Franklin Road, near the intersection
of Five Mile Road, in Boise, Idaho. (Tr., p.7, Ls.4-13, p.9, Ls.17-20, p.16, Ls.22-25.) The officer
observed both passenger-side tires of the truck cross the fog line for approximately 100 yards,
lasting three to five seconds. (Tr., p.7, Ls.14-24, p.15, Ls.1-7.) The officer testified she was
concerned about the driving pattern she observed "[b]ecause ... on that stretch of road there is
about two feet [of pavement] to where a bicyclist could be riding or a person could be walking,
and then it's a field so there is nowhere else for a pedestrian or bicyclist to go," so if a driver is
traveling over the fog line, "he could have potentially hit somebody." (Tr., p.12, Ls.1-11.)
Based solely on her observation of the truck's passenger-side tires crossing the fog line,
and despite the lack of any pedestrians or bicyclists in the area at the time, Officer Livas stopped
the truck, presumably based on a suspicion that the driver had violated Idaho Code§ 49-637(1). 1

1

Officer Livas did not testify regarding the particular statute she believed had been violated. (See
generally Tr., pp.5-17.) However, it is clear from the State's briefing in the district court that it
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(2/14/19 Tr., p.14, L.18 - p.15, L.4.) Officer Livas observed an open beer can in the center
console area, and the driver and sole occupant of the truck, Mr. Devan, was later determined to
have a blood alcohol content of .301. (2/14/19 Tr., p.7, Ls.17-20; Presentence Investigation
Report ("PSI"), pp.51, 58.) Mr. Devan was never cited for a traffic offense.
Following a preliminary hearing, Mr. Devan was charged by Information with felony
DUI and possession of an open container of alcohol in a motor vehicle. (R., pp.28, 40-41.)
Mr. Devan filed a motion to suppress, arguing the evidence found in his vehicle and the
statements he made to the officer should be suppressed because the officer lacked reasonable
suspicion to stop his vehicle. (R., pp.64-72.) The prosecution argued the stop of Mr. Devan's
vehicle was permissible based on the officer's observation of the passenger-side tires of his truck
traveling over the fog line. (R., pp.77-83.) The district court denied Mr. Devan's motion to
suppress following a hearing. (R., p.85.)
Following the denial of his motion to suppress, Mr. Devan entered into an agreement
with the State pursuant to which he agreed to plead guilty to felony DUI, reserving his right to
appeal the denial of his motion to suppress, and the State agreed to dismiss the open container
charge. (5/6/19 Tr., p.5, Ls.4-23; R., p.86.) The district court accepted Mr. Devan's guilty plea.
(5/6/19 Tr., p.13, Ls.11-15; R., p.86.) The district court sentenced Mr. Devan to a unified term of
ten years, with two years fixed, and then suspended the sentence and placed Mr. Devan on
probation for a term often years. (Tr., p.48, Ls.1-11; R., p.113.) The judgment of conviction was
entered on July 3, 2019, and Mr. Devan filed a timely notice of appeal. 2 (R., pp.99-108.)

believed the officer had reasonable suspicion to stop Mr. Devan's vehicle based on a suspected
violation ofldaho Code§ 49-637(1). (See R., pp.78-82.)
2
The district court entered an amended judgment of conviction on July 8, 2019, which
accurately reflects the sentence the district court pronounced at sentencing. (R., p.113.)
2

ISSUE
Did the district court err in denying Mr. Devan's motion to suppress?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred In Denying Mr. Devan's Motion To Suppress

A.

Introduction
The district court denied Mr. Devan's motion to suppress because it concluded Officer

Livas had reasonable suspicion to believe Mr. Devan violated Idaho Code § 49-637(1) when
both passenger-side tires of his truck crossed the fog line for approximately 100 yards, lasting
three to five seconds. The district court erred. It is clear from State v. Neal, 159 Idaho 439
(2015), and State v. Fuller, 163 Idaho 585 (2018), that the fog line is not a lane barrier, and that
an isolated incident of temporarily crossing the fog line does not constitute a violation of§ 49637(1). While driving across the fog line may be considered when evaluating whether an overall
pattern of erratic or unsafe driving gives rise to a reasonable, articulable suspicion that § 49637 ( 1) has been violated, there were no additional indicia of erratic or unsafe driving in this case.
The theoretical possibility that a bicyclist or pedestrian could have been endangered by
Mr. Devan's driving is not enough to constitute a violation of§ 49-637(1).

B.

Standard Of Review
"In reviewing a district court order granting or denying a motion to suppress evidence,

the standard of review is bifurcated." State v. Purdum, 147 Idaho 206, 207 (2009) (citation
omitted).

"This Court will accept the trial court's findings of fact unless they are clearly

erroneous. However, this Court may freely review the trial court's application of constitutional
principles in light of the facts found." Id. (citations omitted). "At a suppression hearing, the
power to assess the credibility of witnesses, resolve factual conflicts, weigh evidence, and draw
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factual inferences is vested in the trial court." State v. Aguirre, 141 Idaho 560, 562 (Ct. App.
2005) (citations omitted).

C.

The District Court Erred In Concluding Officer Livas Had Reasonable Suspicion To
Believe Mr. Devan Violated Idaho Code § 49-637(1) When Both Passenger-Side Tires
Of His Truck Crossed The Fog Line For Approximately 100 Yards, Lasting Three To
Five Seconds
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees "[t]he right of the

people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures, shall not be violated." U.S. Const. amend. IV; see also Idaho Const. art. I, § 17.
While a traffic stop constitutes a seizure under the Fourth Amendment, "[l]imited investigatory
detentions are permissible when justified by an officer's reasonable articulable suspicion that a
person has committed, or is about to commit, a crime." State v. Morgan, 154 Idaho 109, 112
(2013). As such, a traffic stop can be justified if either (1) an officer has a reasonable, articulable
suspicion that the driver has committed an offense, such as a traffic offense, or (2) an officer has
a reasonable, articulable suspicion that the driver is engaged in other criminal activity, such as
driving under the influence of alcohol. Neal, 159 Idaho at 442.
Idaho Code § 49-63 7( 1) states, in pertinent part:

"Whenever any highway has been

divided into two (2) or more clearly marked lanes for traffic . . . [a] vehicle shall be driven as
nearly as practicable entirely within a single lane and shall not be moved from that lane until the
driver has first ascertained that the movement can be made with safety." In Neal, our Supreme
Court considered whether an officer had reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to justify a
traffic stop where he observed the defendant "drive his pickup onto, but not across" the fog line
on two occasions. 159 Idaho at 441. The Court held "that driving onto but not across the lane
marking the right edge of the road does not constitute a violation of Idaho Code section 49-63 7
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and therefore the officer's stop of [the defendant] was not justified." Id. at 447. The Court
arrived at this conclusion by analyzing, and ultimately concluding, that the fog line itself is
within the lane of travel. See id. at 445-46.
In Fuller, our Supreme Court considered whether an officer had reasonable suspicion to
stop the defendant's vehicle where the parties stipulated the front passenger-side tire of the
vehicle crossed the fog line. 163 Idaho at 587. The State attempted to distinguish Neal by noting
the parties in Fuller stipulated the fog line was temporarily crossed, "whereas in Neal the fog
line was temporarily touched by not crossed." Id. at 589. The Fuller Court rejected this
distinction, stating it revealed "a misunderstanding of Neal." Id. The Court explained that
"[n]owhere in Neal did we suggest that the fog line signifies a lane barrier" and, to the contrary,
"[w]e were careful to emphasize that the fog line is not a lane barrier." Id. (emphasis in original).
The Court explained "given that the fog line does not signify a formal lane barrier, an isolated
incident of temporarily crossing the fog line ... does not violate section 49-637(1)." Id. at 590.
The fact that the fog line does not signify a formal lane barrier should resolve the instant
appeal, as it did Fuller. Officer Livas observed the passenger-side tires of Mr. Devan's truck
cross the fog line in an isolated incident, lasting from three to five seconds. (Tr., p.7, Ls.14-24,
p.15, Ls.1-7.) Because the fog line does not signify a formal lane barrier, a temporary crossing of
the fog line, even by two tires instead of one tire, does not violate§ 49-637(1).
The district court concluded to the contrary, noting, as a "distinguishing factor" that
"there is nothing on the roadway [such as potholes, steel plates, or fallen boxes] that would cause
a driver to have to move out of the way." (Tr., p.26, Ls.6-20.) But because the fog line does not
signify a formal lane barrier, Mr. Devan never left his lane within the meaning of§ 49-637(1),
and thus never violated the statute. The district court concluded the officer's observations were
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"enough to warrant a stop and further investigation," see Tr., p.27, Ls.18-21, but there was
nothing to further investigate.
The Fuller Court did recognize that touching or crossing a fog line can be considered as
one factor in evaluating a defendant's overall driving pattern. See Fuller, 163 Idaho at 590. The
Court said: "To be sure, driving onto or across the fog line may be considered when evaluating
whether an overall pattern of erratic or unsafe driving gives rise to a reasonable, articulable
suspicion that 49-637(1) has been violated under the totality of the circumstances." Id. But the
Court went on to state that the suspicion "must be based on more than one tire temporarily
touching or briefly crossing the fog line." Id.
Here, Mr. Devan did not display an overall pattern of erratic or unsafe driving. On the
contrary, his passenger-side tires merely crossed the fog line for a period of three to five seconds.
(Tr., p.7, Ls.4-24, p.15, Ls.1-7.) Officer Livas testified she was concerned Mr. Devan could
potentially have hit a pedestrian or bicyclist, but there were no pedestrians or bicyclists in the
area at the time. (Tr., p.12, Ls.1-11.) If the mere possibility ofa pedestrian or bicyclist traveling
outside the fog line was sufficient to make a driver touching or crossing that line be in violation
of§ 49-637(1), then Neal and Fuller would have been decided differently. Officer Livas testified
that when the fog line ends on Franklin Road, and that section of the roadway turns into a righttum lane, Mr. Devan "kind of veered left a little into the lane that goes straight." (Tr., p.9, Ls.29.) That is, he continued driving straight ahead, appropriately in his lane and within the speed
limit. Under a straightforward application of Neal and Fuller, Officer Livas lacked reasonable
suspicion to believe Mr. Devan violated § 49-637(1), and thus lacked reasonable suspicion to
stop his vehicle.
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CONCLUSION
Mr. Devan respectfully requests that this Court vacate his conviction, reverse the district
court's order denying his motion to suppress, and remand this case to the district court for
further proceedings.
DATED this 13 th day of January, 2020.
/ s/ Andrea W. Reyno Ids
ANDREA W. REYNOLDS
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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